Evidence from both psychology and economics shows that people exaggerate the similarity between the information they have and the information available to others. I present a model of such information projection by assuming that after processing a signal a person overestimates the probability with which this signal is available to others. I apply the model to agency and communication settings. When inferring an expert's skill using ex-post information, a biased evaluator exaggerates the probability that a skilled expert should have made the right choice, and hence underestimates the expert on average. To minimize such underestimation, the agent will be too reluctant to produce useful information ex ante that will be seen more clearly by the evaluator ex post, and too eager to gather information ex ante that the evaluator will independently learn ex post. Hence increasing costless monitoring might lower productivity and increase production costs at the same time. If ex post the biased evaluator learns information that would have been more useful for high types than for low types, the evaluator over-infers skill from performance. If ex post he learns information that would have been more useful for low types than for high types, he under-infers skill from performance. Evidence from, and applications to, medical malpractice, liability regulation, and effective communication are discussed.
Introduction
A vast literature in economics studies the effects of asymmetric information on economic activity. Here it is typically assumed that people correctly perceive the informational differences that exist between them. A wide range of psychological evidence indicates however, that people exaggerate the similarity between the information they have and the information available to others. For example, someone who reviews a physician's diagnosis of an ambiguous Xray after learning ex-post information about the patient's symptoms, may well exaggerate the extent to which the physician should have guessed these symptoms ex ante, and do so to an extent unwarranted by Bayesian information processing. To study such information projection, I assume that prior to processing a signal s j , a person correctly perceives the probability with which this signal is available to others, but after processing it she exaggerates this probability. I show that as a result of such mistakes, the skill of those evaluated by biased examiners will be underestimated, and identify conditions under which too much or too little will be inferred about their skill. I also investigate how those being evaluated change their choices to mitigate the adverse influence of this bias on their reputation, and study how such responses affect the economic value of monitoring.
Camerer, Loewenstein, Weber (1989) provide laboratory evidence that informed traders project their superior information and overestimate how much uninformed traders know, and that such a "curse of knowledge" can survive in markets. In Section 2, I review both controlled laboratory and more stylized field experiments which show that judges evaluating auditors, jurors evaluating public officials or engineers, and medical examiners evaluating physicians or therapists, suffer from hindsight bias and project ex-post information when assessing an agent.
In Section 3, I develop a formal model of information projection building on Camerer, Loewenstein, Weber (1989) .
The fact that evaluators project information means that both the ex-post evaluation and the ex-ante incentives of the agent are affected. To study these effects, in Sections 4 and 5 I turn to the main application of the paper: the influence of hindsight bias on performance evaluation. The application is motivated both by the importance of performance evaluation in labor markets, organizations, medicine, and law, and also by the evidence which indicates that hindsight bias is common in such contexts.
Consider again a radiologist who makes a diagnosis whether or not a patient has cancer based on an X-ray, signal s 1 . Assume that there are two kinds of radiologists: skilled ones and unskilled ones. Skilled radiologists understand the X-ray and unskilled ones do not. Assume that some time after the diagnosis is made, the patient returns with novel symptoms, signal s 2 . An evaluator is then asked to review the X-ray and assess the adequacy of the radiologist's original diagnosis.
A biased evaluator acts as if ex ante the radiologist was aware of the symptoms that developed. She thus believes that a skilled type had both signals s 1 and s 2 , and the unskilled type had signal s 2 , and judges the radiologist as if he had more information available to him than he actually did. This leads to two types of inferential mistakes: underestimation and over-and under-inference.
To see these results, assume first that the combination of signals s 1 and s 2 is fully indicative of the patient's medical condition, but any signal alone as well as no signal allows for a correct diagnosis in only 50 percent of the time. A biased evaluator thus believes that a wrong diagnosis is a sign of no skill and hence underestimates the radiologist on average. More generally, if more information leads to better diagnoses more often, a biased evaluator exaggerates the overall probability of success. She finds a diagnosis that she believes to be right too commonplace and a diagnosis she believes to be wrong too much of a surprise and learns too little from the former and too much from the latter. Since an unskilled radiologist is always more likely to be wrong than a skilled one, the evaluator exaggerates the probability that the radiologist is unskilled. Alternatively, consider a scenario where the radiologist has many radiographs and his skill lies in figuring out which one to focus on. Here, underestimation arises not because the evaluator believes that a skilled radiologist should have been able to interpret a given X-ray better than he did, but because in light of ex-post information the evaluator thinks that a skilled radiologist should have known better which X-ray to focus on.
While underestimation concerns the evaluator's average beliefs, information projection might change her conditional beliefs as well. Assume that the combination of the X-ray and the patient's symptoms is perfectly indicative of whether the patient had cancer or not, but the X-ray alone is uninformative. Then in the evaluator's mind, a failed diagnosis is a sign of no skill and a good diagnosis is a sign of skill. The evaluator thus becomes too impressed after seeing a good diagnosis and too critical after seeing a failed one. More generally, whenever ex-post information about the patient's medical condition could have helped a skilled radiologist more than an unskilled one, biased evaluators over-infer from performance.
Suppose on the other hand the evaluator believes the X-ray provides only noisy information about cancer, but that symptoms alone are almost perfectly informative. In light of the symptoms, a biased evaluator will be perplexed by a wrong diagnosis that both types are equally likely to make, and will find a good diagnosis to be the norm. Thus the evaluator is not impressed enough by a good diagnosis and is not critical enough of a failed one. More generally, whenever ex-post information could have helped an unskilled radiologist more than a skilled one, biased evaluators under-infer from performance.
Given these results, a natural question to ask is how the radiologist might change his behavior to minimize the adverse effects of information projection on his reputation. Evidence from medicine and law suggests that experts are often aware that those evaluating them are biased, and take actions to mitigate the effects of the bias on their reputation. For example, it is argued that "defensive medicine", medical procedures designed to minimize false liability rather than maximize cost-effective health care, is due partly to the fear of experts that those evaluating them will suffer from hindsight bias.
To understand how anticipating the bias changes the behavior of the radiologist, assume that he can decide to produce an additional radiograph ex ante. I show that if this radiograph provides the information ex ante that the evaluator will independently learn ex post, s 2 , the radiologist has an incentive to produce such information, even if it would be too costly in the rational case. For example, a costly MRI might be ordered for all patients with backache before further treatment is recommended if the evaluator inevitably learns the information on the MRI ex post. At the same time, the radiologist is too reluctant to produce a radiograph that helps him make a good diagnosis but can be interpreted better in light of ex-post information. For example, the radiologist might avoid ordering a mammography that helps detect breast cancer if he fears it can be interpreted much better in hindsight than in foresight. Thus information projection may mean that increasing the likelihood of ex-post evaluations might lower the productivity of the radiologist and may exacerbate the types of over-and underproduction of information that observers have attributed to medical malpractice regulation. 1 If the management of a hospital is aware of evaluators propensity for hindsight bias, it can correct this mistake to some extent. In important situations however, even the perfect anticipation of the evaluator's bias cannot eliminate inefficiencies. To show this, in Section 5 I turn from a context where the amount of information that the radiologist learns from an X-ray is a function of his skill to situations where it is a function of how much effort he exerts.
To motivate the radiologist, a hospital may provide incentives to encourage a careful reading of the X-ray. When the radiologist's effort is not observed however, the reward scheme may reward and punish him solely based on whether the recommended treatment led to an improvement or a deterioration in the patient's condition. In cases of limited liability or risk-averse radiologists no such reward scheme can be first-best optimal. Incentive theory shows that a second-best scheme may instead involve monitoring the radiologist and rewarding him based on whether his diagnosis accorded with the information available to him. Such monitoring allows to tie rewards more closely to effort rather than to luck.
A biased evaluator, however, is prone to judge the correctness of the diagnosis not on the basis of ex-ante available information, s 1 , but on the basis of both ex-ante and ex-post information, s 1 and s 2 . Thus the radiologist is punished too often for bad luck and rewarded too rarely for good decisions. As a result, the radiologist's incentive to carefully understand the X-ray is lower than in the case where he is monitored by a Bayesian evaluator. More generally, an agent who is de jure facing a negligence rule is de facto punished and rewarded according to strict liability if he is assessed by a biased judge or jury.
I show that the report of a biased evaluator contains too much noise and hence even if the hospital anticipates the bias, it has a reason to monitor less often than in the rational case. I also show that if the hospital does rely on biased reports, it nevertheless decides to induce lower levels of effort to save on incentives that are appropriate in the rational case, but too strong in the biased case.
In Section 6, I turn to the influence of information projection on communication. I show that a listener who projects his private information will be too credulous of a speaker's advice because he overestimates how much the speaker knows. I also show that a speaker who projects information on her background knowledge will mistakenly send messages that are too ambiguous for her audience to interpret. Finally, I show that a biased speaker over-communicates messages that can be interpreted given a background knowledge that the listener does not have, while under-communicates messages that can be interpreted given the existing background knowledge of the listener.
In Section 7, I conclude with a brief discussion of further implications and extensions of my model. I discuss how information projection might affect social inferences in networks causing hostility between groups, as well as the possibility of extending my model to capture the related phenomenon of ignorance projection where a person who does not observe signal s j underestimates the probability that s j is available to others.
Evidence and Related Literature
Folk wisdom for long has recognized the existence of what I call information projection, as noted by the common refrain, "hindsight is 20/20". In this section, I review evidence from a variety of domains supporting my claim that information projection is a robust and widespread phenomenon. Although individual studies are often subject to alternative interpretations, the sum-total of the studies provides a compelling case for the existence of information projection. I begin this section by discussing both laboratory and more stylized evidence on two closely related phenomena: hindsight bias -the phenomenon that people form biased judgements in hindsight relative to foresight -, and the curse of knowledge -the phenomenon that informed people overestimate the information of those uninformed. I then turn to a brief summary of some evidence on related biases lending support to the existence of the projection of various forms of private information.
Hindsight bias studies involve both between-subject designs, in which participants guess the estimates of less informed participants, and within-subject designs, in which participants have to recall their own prior estimates after being presented with new evidence. Curse of knowledge studies are analogous to the former. Since my focus in this paper is on interpersonal information projection, I emphasize the between-subject designs.
The presence of information projection in experimental financial markets was demonstrated by Camerer, Loewenstein, Weber (1989) . A group of Wharton and Chicago MBA students traded assets of eight different companies in a double-oral auction. Traders were divided into (2006) two groups. In the first group, traders were presented with the past earnings history of the companies (not including 1980) and traded assets that yielded returns in proportion to the actual 1980 earnings of these companies. In the second group, traders received the same information, and in addition they also learned the actual 1980 earnings of the companies. By design, returns for traders in the second group depended on the market price established by those in the first group. Therefore to maximize earnings, better-informed traders had to guess as correctly as possible the market price at which less-informed traders traded these assets. If traders in the second group project their information, their guesses and hence the price at which they trade will be significantly different from the market price established by the first group. Further, CLW (1989) finds that the guesses of better-informed traders were biased by 60% towards the actual 1980 earnings and market prices were biased by 30%. 2 The reason why the bias in the market was lower than in judgements is that traders with a smaller bias traded more aggressively. Less biased traders behaved as if they had anticipated that others would project information. CLW also showed that learning opportunities did not decrease the bias.
Illustrative evidence of information projection comes from the experimental study of Loewenstein, Moore, Weber (2006) who build on CLW (1989). They study the curse of knowledge using a set of visual recognition tasks. In these tasks, subjects are presented with two pictures that differ in one crucial detail. LMW (2006) divided subjects into three groups: uninformed, informed, and choice. In the uninformed condition, no additional information was available besides the two pictures. In the informed condition, the difference between the pictures was highlighted for the subjects. In the choice condition, subjects could decide whether to obtain additional information for a small fee, or remain uninformed. After looking at the pictures, the subjects in each group were asked to guess what fraction of people in the uninformed group could tell the difference between the two pictures. Subjects were compensated based on how well they predicted this fraction.
As Figure 1 indicates, the informed subjects' mean estimate was significantly higher than the uninformed subjects' mean estimate. Importantly, a significant portion of the people in the choice condition paid for additional information. In this group, the mean estimate was 55.4%, while the mean estimate of subjects who chose to remain uninformed was 34.6%. Hence people not only projected their additional information, but also paid for information that biased their judgements in a way that lower their earnings. The work of Fischhoff (1975) and Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) initiated research on hindsight bias. Fischhoff (1975) showed that reporting an outcome of an uncertain historical event increases the perceived ex-ante likelihood of the reported outcome occurring. Fischhoff's findings were replicated by a plethora of studies, which involved tasks of judging the relative ex-ante likelihood of events given additional ex-post information. Many of these studies find evidence of even more severe information projection than the one reported by Fischhoff (1975) . A robust comparative static result is that the more informative the outcome the greater is the bias. 3 As I demonstrate in Section 3, my model of information projection exhibits the same monotonicity.
Experiments have demonstrated the existence of information projection in the evaluation of ex-ante judgements of various experts. Anderson et al. (1997) documented the existence of the bias in judges deciding on cases of auditors' liability where auditors failed to predict the financial problems of their audit clients. The existence of information projection was also shown for experts in the medical arena. Caplan, Posner and Cheney (1991) conducted a study with 112 practicing anesthesiologists where physicians saw identical case histories but were either told that the case ended in either minor or severe damages. Those who were told that a severe damage occurred were more likely to judge care to be negligent. In certain cases, the difference in the frequency of ruling negligence was as great as 51%. Bukszar and Terry (1988) demonstrate hindsight bias in the solution of business case studies, Hastie, Schkade and Payne (1999) document very serious biases in jurors' judgement of punitive liability.
More generally, in the context of liability judgements, there is a wealth of evidence that juries and experienced judges fail to ignore superior information and instead form judgements as if the defendant had information that was unavailable at the time he acted. Strong effects were found among others in experiments on the assessment of railroad accidents, legality of search, evaluation of military officers, and fraud complaints against accountants or auditors. For survey articles on the evidence see e.g. Rachinski (1998) and Harley (2007). 4 A set of other psychological findings further indicate that people project various types of private information. A study by Gilovich, Medvec and Savitsky (1998) shows that people greatly overestimate the probability that their lies, once made, are detected by others. 5 Such overestimation was also documented in the context of communication. In a set of experiments, Kruger et al (2005) found that when people communicate through email, they overestimate how well their intent is transmitted through their messages. 6 Here, senders had to make serious and sarcastic statements either through email or voice recording, and then guess the probability that receivers would be able to understand their intent. As Figure 2 shows, the mean estimate for both those sending an email and those sending a voice recording was 78%, while the actual probabilities were 73% in the voice condition and 58% in the email condition. Kruger et al. (2005) also conduct an experiment where they ask subjects in the email condition to vocalize their messages before sending them. Senders are again divided into two groups; some are asked to vocalize the message in the same tone as the tone of their email, and others are asked to vocalize it in the opposite tone. Senders in both groups overestimate how easy it would be to understand their messages, yet such overestimation decreased significantly in the case where senders vocalize in the opposite tone. While some of these results may be due to general overconfidence about one's ability to communicate, the evidence is more consistent with the interpretation of information projection.
My paper builds closely on the experimental results of Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber (1989). CLW offer a preliminary model of this bias by assuming that a better informed trader's estimate of the mean of a less informed trader's estimate of the value of an asset is the linear combination of the better informed trader's estimate of this mean value and the less informed traders' estimate of this mean value. Biais and Weber (2007) build on this formalization of CLW and assume that after observing a realization of a random variable, a person misperceives the mean of her prior on this variable to be the mean of her own posterior. Biais and Weber then study whether this formulation of within person hindsight bias can explain trading behavior consistent with underreaction to news. They also test their hypothesis using psychometric and investment data from a sample of investment bankers in Frankfurt and London. The evidence I summarized in this section is indicative of the fact that people project various forms of information in many domains. Although this evidence comes from a diverse set of experimental paradigms that use different methods of identification and classify information projection under a variety of rubrics, the model that I present in the next section provides a framework to study this phenomenon in a more unified manner. It also provides a setup to make more precise predictions about the implications of information projection in organizations and markets and to test such predictions.
Model
Consider an environment where people observe signals about the underlying physical state ω ∈ Ω ⊂ R, where Ω is bounded. An example of ω could be the fundamental value of a company's stock, the medical condition of a patient, or the geophysical conditions of a place where an engineer is commissioned to build a bridge. Let there be M people and N different signals {s j } N j=1 . A signal is a function s j (ω) : Ω −→ ∆Z from the set of states to the set of lotteries over a realization space Z. These signals provide information about the state through the correlation between the observed outcome from Z and the state ω ∈ Ω. Information is interpreted given a common prior σ(ω) over Ω, where this prior also determines people's shared view about ω absent any signals. In what follows, I distinguish between the availability and the processing of a signal. Availability refers to the fact that this signal is present, while processing refers to the fact that its information content is understood, which might require skill or effort. As an illustration, note that only someone who has training in medicine knows what to infer from a radiograph. Similarly, someone who does not understand the basic principles of finance understands little from reading stock reports. This distinction though typically not emphasized in the economics literature is a natural one to make. In cases where this distinction applies, I assume that p m concerns the availability of a signal. In cases where availability automatically implies processing the above distinction is vacuous.
We can now define information projection in this model. A person who makes the mistake of information projection exaggerates the probability that a signal is available to others if she processes this signal. To measure the extent of this mistake I introduce a parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1] which measures the degree to which information is projected.
Definition 1 Person i exhibits interpersonal information projection of degree
Information projection by person i corresponds to the overestimation of the arrival probabilities for the signals this person processed. Such overestimation is increasing in ρ i . If ρ i = 0, then the person has a correct Bayesian perception and does not exaggerate the arrival probabilities of processed signals. If ρ i = 1, then she exhibits full information projection and her perception of the arrival probabilities of the signals she processed is that they are equal to 1. In cases where 0 < ρ i < 1 the person exhibits partial information projection. 7 Intuition suggests that certain pieces of information are projected more than others and that the extent to which a particular piece of information is projected depends on a number or factors. In the above definition, I allow for heterogeneity in projection by allowing ρ to vary across signals and across individuals. If ρ j i is the degree to which person i projects signal s j then such heterogeneity exists whenever ρ
Here, I do not attempt to pin down the factors determining the value of ρ. My claim though is that the evidence suggests that in a number of economically important domains ρ > 0. More research is needed though to get a better understanding of why certain signals are projected more than others.
Note that, while full information projection is not, partial information projection is sensitive to re-description of signals. For example, if two signals are collapsed into one then partial projection of the combined signal induces a different probability distribution on the information of player m 0 then if the two signals were projected individually. In most relevant applications 7 In certain contexts, for greater psychological realism or for issues of measurability, the following transformation of the true probabilities into perceived probabilities is more appropriate: though there is a natural way to break down information into distinct signals or groups of signals. For example in the case of hindsight bias in performance evaluation where information projection happens over time the timing of information already suggests a way to break down information into distinct signals. Importantly, however, almost all results in this paper are qualitative and do not depend on the use of partial projection. 8 There is also another sense in which the exact separation of signals is important in my setup. This concerns the distinction between availability and processing. If one signal requires skill to be processed and the other does not, then my model has different implications when these two signals are collapsed into one, or considered to be separate. Here, I always assume that the degree to which a signal requires skill to be processed is fixed.
As mentioned in Section 2, evidence suggests that in important contexts, people anticipate that others are biased. Since I build on this fact in the applications, I define such anticipation formally. Let the probability density function f i,k (ρ) describe the beliefs of person i concerning the extent to which person k 6 = i projects her information. If f i,k is not concentrated on 0, person i believes that there is a non-zero probability that person k is biased. Two types of anticipation are of special interest. First, if person i believes that person k is not biased then the cdf generated by f i,k is such that
A Dinner
Many of the paper's results follow from two general principles about how information projection affects beliefs, which I present in a simple stylized setup where a dinner guest infers something about the host's intentions. Consider a world where a host has to choose between one of two meals A or B that she offers to her guest. Let the choice of the host be y ∈ {A, B}. Let there be two states, ω A and ω B : in ω A the guest likes A and dislikes B, and the other way round in ω B . The host is either kind and wants to offer a meal that the guest likes, or she is unkind and wishes to enjoy meals she likes. Let these two types be θ kind and θ mean . Assume that it is always equally likely that the host enjoys meal A more than meal B or vice versa.
The host observes a noisy signal s 1 about the guest's taste, where Pr(s 1 = ω | ω) = h and h ≥ 0.5. Assume that the guest is better informed about his own taste. Let the guest's information be given by signal s 2 , where Pr(s 2 = ω | ω) = z and z > h.
Assume for a moment that the guest knows his taste but the host is uninformed about it. Formally, assume that h = 0.5 and z = 1. A biased guest who projects s 2 overestimates the probability that the host is kind if the host prepares a meal he likes, ω = y. Similarly, a biased guest overestimates the probability that the host is hostile if she prepares a meal that he dislikes, ω 6 = y. Let the prior beliefs of the guest be π 0 (θ), and assume that initially the guest believes that it is equally likely that the host is kind or mean. The following table summarizes the posterior, π ρ 1 (θ), of a Bayesian versus a fully biased guest:
Note that while a Bayesian guest does not infer anything from the host's choice, a biased guest comes to believe that he can make a perfect inference about the host's intentions. More generally, whenever the guest's signal about his state is more precise than the signal of the host, the guest overestimates how well different types separate. Let π ρ 1 (θ) be the posterior of a ρ−biased guest and assume that it is equally likely that the host has the same taste or the opposite taste as the guest. The following proposition shows that the guest overinfers from the host's choice.
Proposition 1 For all h < z and π 0 (θ) with full support, π
A biased guest overinfers from the host's choice because he overestimates how much the host knows about his taste. The above proposition holds independently of whether the guest actually observes the realization of s 1 , or just knows that the host observed s 1 but does not know its realization. In both cases, the guest exaggerates how much the host knew, and in expected terms infers too much from her choice.
Consider now not the conditional beliefs of the guest but his expected average beliefs about the intentions of the host. A fully biased guest ex-ante believes that if the probability that the guest is kind is q, he faces a probability of 1 2 (1 + q) of being served a meal he likes. In contrast, a Bayesian guest estimates this probability to be 1 2 . As a consequence, a biased guest is too surprised when he is offered a meal he does not like and learns too much from such an observation. This then causes him to underestimate the probability that the host is kind to him on average.
To see this in a numeric example, assume that q = 0.5. A biased guest then expects to be served a meal he prefers with probability 
A biased guest who knows more about his own taste than the host overestimates the probability with which the host she can serve his preferred meal if she wants to. This implies that on average the guest underestimates the probability that the host cares about his taste. As the following proposition shows this result holds for all z > h.
is decreasing in ρ where expectations are taken with respect to the true distribution of signals.
To further illustrate this point, consider a case where the guest and the host receive i.i.d. noisy signals about the state. Assume that the guest mistakenly believes that the host observed the exact same signal realization as he did. As long as the two signals are i.i.d., the expected posterior of a biased observer and that of Bayesian one are the same. Underestimation happens only if the biased guest has more information than the host. Even in this case, however, overinference has an interesting implication. Assume that it so happens that the host has the same taste as the guest. Here a fully biased guest on average infers that the host is kind with probability 2 3 . In contrast, if it happens to be so that the host has a different taste, then a fully biased guest on average infers that the host is kind with probability 1 3 . Thus a biased guest misattributes differences in taste to differences in intentions.
Skill Assessment
In this section I turn to the main application of the paper -the problem of performance evaluation. Performance evaluation is generally viewed as one of the key allocative and incentive mechanisms of (internal) labor markets. It is regarded as a procedure that allows for better incentives in problems of moral hazard, and more efficient allocation of talent in problems of adverse selection. In most organizations it guides firing, promotion and compensation decisions, and in many contexts it serves as the basis of efficient organization of production. 9 As suggested in Section 2, this context is also one where there is a significant presence of information projection.
Consider an agent whose task is to process information and take an optimal action based on this information. Assume that agents are heterogenous in their ability to process information and the more skilled is the agent the more likely it is that he will be able to process the information available to him. Understanding more information helps to make a correct decision with a higher probability, and hence the agent's skill is a key component of his productivity.
Assume that the agent's skill is unobservable. To learn about his skill a supervisor is hired by a principal to assess the agent's skill through evaluating his performance. The supervisor observes a performance measure after the agent completes the task along with some novel information which was not available to the agent. The following Consider for example a social worker who is assigned a case of foster care. After the injury of the child the state commissions a supervisor to investigate whether the social worker was efficient at preventing this outcome. All the home visits and the phone calls of the social worker are reviewed to establish whether the social worker acted appropriately given his information. A biased supervisor projects information that becomes available only through learning that the child was injured.
The first result of this section shows that a biased supervisor underestimates the skill level of the agent. Intuitively, since the supervisor exaggerates how much information was available to the social worker, she exaggerates how likely a success is relative to a failure. The second result concerns not the average but the conditional assessments of the supervisor. It shows that the way information projection affects conditional assessments depends on whether in the misperceived task, differences in luck or differences in skill contribute more to differences in performance. In the former case, a biased supervisor underinfers from performance, in the latter case, she overinfers from it. I conclude this section by showing how increasing the frequency of monitoring changes the behavior of an agent who anticipates the bias.
Setup
Consider a setup where a task is assigned to the agent. The outcome of this task is either a success (S) or a failure (F ). Assume first that the agent has only a passive role and always takes an action y ∈ Ω, where Ω ⊂ R and is bounded, such as to maximize the probability of success given her information. 10 Let the principal's utility function be V (r, w) where r is the principal's revenue and w is the compensation to the agent.
The timing of task completion is as follows; first, signals s 1 and s 2 become available to the agent, second, the agent takes an action y, finally, a performance measure µ is realized along with additional information s 3 about the state ω. I assume that the information in s 1 is such that it does not require skill to be processed, while processing s 2 does require skill. I also assume that each signal is productive in the sense that adding a signal to an information set increases the probability of success conditional on processing this information. 11 
Skill
Let θ ∈ [0, 1] denote the agent's skill level and assume that a type θ agent processes s 2 with probability θ. This means that with probability θ he can condition his choices on the information content of s 2 and with probability 1 − θ his information about ω does not change upon receiving s 2 . Assume that the supervisor does not know θ but has a prior over θ given by π 0 (θ). 12 Given the assumption that adding a signal to the agent's information set increases the probability of success, it follows that Pr(S | s 1 , s 2 , θ) > Pr(S | s 1 , s 2 , θ 0 ) whenever θ > θ 0 . I also assume that this property holds given s 3 as well, thus
whenever θ > θ 0 . Finally, I assume for simplicity that the agent does not know his skill either, and his prior is the same as that of the supervisor. 13 Note that the principal's expected revenue r is increasing in θ. This dependence of r on θ motivates performance evaluation because the supervisor might want to promote an agent with a high θ or fire an agent with a low θ. Thus the assessment of θ implicitly defines a dynamic setup where there are tasks to complete in each period and where employment and compensation decisions are also made in each period. Here the compensation decision w can also be understood as a decision whether to re-employ or to promote the agent.
An Example
To illustrate the formal setup, consider first a specific information and task structure. Let Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4} and let signal s 1 provide noisy information on whether the state is an even or an odd number. Formally, let Pr(s 1 = z | z} = h where z ∈ {even, odd} and h ∈ [0.5, 1]. Let s 2 give precise information on whether the state is low (ω ≤ 2) or high (ω > 2). Finally, let the ex-post signal s 3 tell precisely whether the state is an even or an odd number. Assume that a success occurs if y = ω and a failure occurs otherwise. Since s 2 is processed with probability θ by an agent of type θ, the true probability of success for a type θ agent is
where subscript 0 always refers to the case where the supervisor is unbiased. If the supervisor projects s 3 , she exaggerates the above probability because she overestimates the precision of the agent's information on whether the true state was odd or even. The perceived probability given a projection of degree ρ is:
where subscript ρ refers to the case degree of the supervisor's bias ρ.
The above equation means that for each type θ, the more biased the supervisor is the more he exaggerates the probability with which a type θ should guess the state correctly. The extent of this exaggeration is decreasing in h because the higher is h the smaller is the amount of the ex-post information that was not available ex-ante.
Assume that the supervisor observes only whether a success or failure occurs but not the action of the agent. Let π ρ 1 (S) and π ρ 1 (F ) denote a ρ-biased supervisor's updated beliefs about θ conditional on observing a success or a failure, respectively. The following result shows that a biased assessment after a success is equal to the unbiased assessment, but it is lower than that after a failure.
For all π 0 and ρ > 0, increasing h leads to an increase in π ρ 1 (F ) in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
The biased supervisor has correct beliefs after a success because information projection does not change the likelihood ratio of success between a higher and lower skilled agent. The biased supervisor, however, underestimates the agent's skill after a failure because s 3 distorts the likelihood ratios of failing. In the misperceived task high types are relatively less likely to fail than low types compared to the true task. This assessment after a failure is lower than in the unbiased case.
Underestimation
Although the above example was illustrative of the setup, it did not explicate how information projection changes the supervisor's assessment more generally. To identify this mechanism, let me now turn to the more general case. The first result is also the main result of this section. It claims that if the supervisor projects productive information, she underestimates the agent's skill level on average. Thus, information projection introduces a systematic underestimation of the agent's skill. Since the supervisor projects productive information, she overestimates the overall probability of a success and underestimates the overall probability of a failure. Hence she is more surprised observing a failure and less surprised observing a success than in the unbiased case. As a result a biased supervisor puts more weight on the information revealed by a failure and less weight on the information revealed by a success than a Bayesian supervisor. Since lower types are more likely to fail than higher types, this leads to an underestimation of the agent's skill on average. 14 Proposition 3 shows that if the supervisor has access to information that the agent did not have, the supervisor is negatively biased in her assessment. The next corollary shows that the more productive is the information projected the greater is the underestimation.
Proposition 3 Suppose
In the analysis above, I assumed that the supervisor's inference is based on a performance measure which consists of either a success or a failure and ex-post information s 3 . Importantly, the informativeness of s 3 might also depend on the depth of the performance measure available to the supervisor. Consider a setting where success and failure are very noisy measures of the agent's skill. This happens when the observed performance measures are greatly determined by luck say because the probability of a success varies very little in what action the agent takes. Here, observing a success or a failure alone allows for only minimal inference about θ. To obtain a more precise estimate of the agent's skill, the supervisor might decide to investigate the agent by observing y, the action he took, and the realization of s 1 and s 2 and hence establishing whether the agent acted optimally given the information available to him. In the Bayesian case, where the supervisor can ignore s 3 , an investigation might well lead to more precise estimates of θ. In the biased case, however, the success probability for each type is exaggerated, and hence Proposition 3 implies that the agent's skill is underestimated. Thus investigations might be welfare reducing in the biased case even if they are welfare improving in the Bayesian one.
Over-and Under-inference
Proposition 3 is consistent with the general wisdom that hindsight bias leads to too much expost blame. It does not imply, however, that underestimation occurs both after a failure and a success. The mechanism, which implies underestimation on average, is consistent both with giving too much credit after a success, and with assigning too little blame after a failure. The effect of information projection on conditional beliefs depends not on the exaggeration of the overall probability of success, but rather on the nature of the projected information. More precisely, they depend on whether projected information increases or decreases the extent to which differences in performance are attributed to differences in skill or differences in unobservable luck. To see this, consider the following two examples. 
Example 1 Over-inference
while the perceived probability of success of type θ with full information projection
In the limit, where h = 0.5, performance is not informative about skill because Pr(S | θ) 0 is the same for all θ. A biased supervisor, however, believes that performance is informative about skill because in her perception Pr(S | θ) ρ is increasing in θ. She thus perceives a success to be a sign of above average skill and a failure to be a sign of below average skill. Thus information projection leads to completely illusory inferences about talent. More generally, a biased supervisor overestimates the dispersion of success probabilities across types, and hence exaggerates the extent to which differences in performance are due to skill rather than luck. To see this formally, note that the ratio Pr(S | θ) ρ / Pr(S | θ) 0 is increasing in θ. It is easy to compute that in this example π ρ 1 (S) first-order stochastically dominates π 1 (S), and π 1 (F ) first-order stochastically dominates π ρ 1 (F ) for all π 0 and ρ. If the supervisor makes employment decisions based on such illusory inference, she might fire the agent after a bad performance even if she should not. When turnover is costly, illusory inference might well be welfare decreasing. 15 
Example 2 Under-inference
Let again ω = 1 2 and s 1 and s 2 and σ be as in the previous example. Let the ex-post information now be given by s 3 where Pr(s 3 = 2,t | 2,t ) = z for all t. Here in contrast to the previous example, the productivity of s 3 depends on whether the agent processed s 2 or not. If s 2 was processed by the agent, s 3 adds no information. If s 2 was not processed by the agent, s 3 increases the agent's probability of success. Here, the true probability of success for a type θ agent is
and the perceived probability with full information projection is
In the limit, where z = 1, the perceived probability of success equals h for all types. This means that a fully biased supervisor does not update her beliefs after observing a success or a failure because she believes that differences in performance are due entirely to differences in luck. More generally, in contrast to the previous case, the projected signal is such that it decreases the dispersion of success rates across different types. To see this, note that the ratio of the perceived probability of success and the true probability of success, Pr(S | θ) 1 / Pr(S | θ) 0 , is now decreasing in the agent's skill level. This implies that a biased supervisor perceives a success as a weaker signal of skill than it really is. Again, it is easy to compute that in this example, π 1 (S) first-order stochastically dominates π The above two examples show that underestimation on average can be consistent with both over-and under-inference in conditional beliefs. Furthermore, these examples also point to those characteristics of the informational environment that determine whether over-or underinference happens. If the projected information helps skilled types more than unskilled types, it leads to over-inference. If the converse is true, information projection leads to under-inference. The reason is that in the former case differences in performance are attributed too much to differences in skill, while in the latter case, they are attributed too much to differences in luck.
When projected information increases the perceived productivity of high types more than the perceived productivity of low types, a biased supervisor becomes too optimistic after a success and too pessimistic after a failure. Conversely, if the projected information increases the perceived productivity of low types more than the perceived productivity of high types, a biased supervisor becomes too optimistic after a success. Whether in this second case the supervisor becomes too pessimistic or too optimistic after observing a failure, depends on the relative strength of two effects: under-inference and underestimation. Under-inference implies that after observing a failure, a biased supervisor becomes less pessimistic than a Bayesian one. Underestimation implies the opposite. The relative strength of the these two effects depends on more specific assumptions about the information structure. As Example 2 shows, however, it is possible that the first effect dominates the second and hence a biased supervisor is too optimistic after a failure.
Production of Information
Let me finally turn to the behavior of an agent who anticipates the supervisor's bias. A consequence of Proposition 3 is that if the agent prefers a higher assessment to a lower, information projection decreases his welfare. Hence, to avoid the adverse effects of the bias, he wants to adjust his behavior so as to minimize the impact of the bias. If he has discretion over what tasks to accept and what tasks to refuse, the desire to avoid underestimation will influence his task choice.
Assume that the agent's utility function is given by
where w is his compensation after a success, and a is the utility cost of effort. For simplicity, let's normalize compensation after a failure to be zero. The term G(π Assume that this utility is increasing in the supervisor's assessment in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, and also that the agent is risk neutral over the utility from reputation. Formally,
Given the first part of the above assumption, an immediate corollary of Proposition 3, is that the agent prefers tasks with as little ex-post information as possible. Since the more productive s 3 is, the greater is the underestimation, the agent will prefer to opt for tasks that would be dominated in a Bayesian setting but involve a less productive s 3 . Another corollary of Proposition 3 is that other things equal, the agent prefers tasks that do not involve signals that require skill to be processed. Since inference about the agent's skill can only take place if his task involves signals that require skill to be processed, in the absence of such tasks no underestimation can occur. Hence, the agent might choose tasks that lead to a lower probability of success but are uninformative about his skills. 16 When the agent cannot avoid either ex-post information or information that requires skill to be processed, there is still an important margin along which the agent might want to change his behavior. Assume that the task is such that there is always information in performance about the agent's skill. Let there be a fixed set of signals {s} in the task, and assume that the agent can decide whether to produce an additional productive signal s 0 or not. For notational simplicity, I suppress {s} in the formulation of the problem below.
The direct benefit from producing s 0 is the increase in the probability with which a success occurs if s 0 is understood. The direct cost of s 0 is the effort required to produce it. Let the cost of this effort be a. A third cost or benefit derives from the way s 0 changes the supervisor's evaluation of the agent's skill. Let π ρ 1 denote the supervisor's assessment if s 0 is not produced, and let π ρ 1 [s 0 ] be the supervisor's assessment if s 0 is produced. These assessments are not based on whether the agent produced s 0 per se, but rather on the inference that the supervisor can make about θ given the task that contains only {s} and the task that contains {s} + s 0 .
Let m denote the ex-ante probability with which the agent is evaluated. Since the supervisor's assessment of θ changes only conditional on the fact that she evaluates the agent for a fixed monitoring frequency m and bias ρ, the agent's choice whether to produce signal s 0 is determined by the following inequality:
The left-hand side of this inequality is the direct benefit minus the direct cost of producing signal s 0 . 17 The right-hand side of this inequality is the loss in expected reputation from producing s 0 . In the Bayesian case the choice to produce s 0 is independent from ex-post information since such information does not affect the supervisor's assessment. Furthermore, given our simplifying assumption that the agent is risk-neutral over the utility from reputation, the RHS of the above inequality is always equal to 0. 18 In the biased case, however, the choice whether to produce s 0 also depends on the relationship of s 0 and the ex-post information s 3 . To see this, let me distinguish between two ways the productivity of s 0 and s 3 could be linked. I call s 0 and s 3 substitutes if processing s 0 decreases the productivity gain from having s 3 , and call these two signals complements if processing s 0 increases the productivity gain from having s 3 . The following definition introduces these two properties formally. If the two signals are substitutes, the right-hand side of Eq. (4) is negative. This means that the expected utility from reputation with s 0 is higher than without it. Here information projection increases the incentives to produce s 0 . If the two signals are complements, the righthand side of Eq. (4) is positive. This means the expected utility from reputation is higher without s 0 . Here information projection decreases the incentives to produce s 0 . Let a(m, ρ) denote the cost so that the agent is indifferent between having s 0 or not, given monitoring 17 If the full benefit and cost is internalized by the agent then this is positive whenever it is socially optimal to produce s 0 . 18 Importantly though the independence from s 3 is not a function of this assumption. This separates the result in this section from other results that show under-production of information or the choice of risky projects due to risk aversion over future compensation as in Hermalin (1993). frequency m and a bias of degree ρ. The following proposition claims that an increase in monitoring leads to an increase in the production of substitute information, and a decrease in the production of complement information relative to the Bayesian case. To clarify the intuition behind this result, let's return to the example of the radiologist. A radiologist has additional incentives to undertake diagnostic procedures that substitute for ex-post information. The reason is that such diagnostic procedures reduce the probability of unwarranted ex-post blame. Even when such procedures are socially inefficient, a radiologist will undertake them to maintain a good reputation of his abilities. This implies that the more he is monitored, the more expensive his services will be on such tasks. At the same time, a radiologist has additional incentives to avoid information that can be interpreted much better in hindsight than in foresight. Even if the production of such information increases productivity more than it increases costs, the radiologist is better-off without it because this way he can avoid developing a bad reputation. The more often the radiologist is monitored the stronger this effect is.
Incentives
In the pervious section, I showed that a biased supervisor underestimates the agent's skill on average. A principal who makes employment and compensation decisions can to some extent correct the supervisor's mistake if he anticipates that her reports are too negative on average. In most situations, however, a principal does not have as detailed information about the agent's task as the supervisor and hence such corrections might introduce other forms of inefficiencies and might not eliminate the incentives of the agent to act against underestimation.
In this section, I turn from a context where the amount of information that the agent learns from a signal is a function of his skill to situations where it is a function of how much effort he exerts; i.e. how often the radiologist understands X-rays depends on how carefully he evaluates them. A careful evaluation is costly because it requires the radiologist to exert effort. To provide incentives for the radiologist, the principal offers him a contract which rewards the radiologist for a good health outcome versus a bad health outcome. If a health outcome is only a noisy measure of the correctness of the radiologist's diagnosis better incentives can be provided if the principal hires a supervisor to monitor the radiologist by tieing reward and punishment closer to whether the radiologist made the correct diagnosis based on the information available to him. 19 The main result of this section is that if the supervisor projects ex-post information, the efficiency gain from monitoring is decreased. I show that if the supervisor believes that the agent could have learned the true state, the radiologist is punished too often and exerts less effort than in the Bayesian case. I also show that when the principal designing incentives anticipates the supervisor's bias, he wants to monitor less often, and even if he monitors to induce less effort on the part of the agent than in the Bayesian case. The reason is that information projection, even if anticipated by the principal, introduces noise in the supervisor's reports and hence decreases the efficiency of monitoring. 20 
Effort
The setup in this section, is similar to the one in the previous section with the exception that processing s 2 requires effort rather than skill. I assume that the level of this effort determines the probability with which the agent reads signal s 2 . Let p(a) be the probability that s 2 is read when the agent exerts effort a, and let 1 − p(a) be the probability that she does not understand the signal given effort a. I assume decreasing returns to effort in terms of the processing probability. Formally, p 0 (a) > 0 and p 00 (a) < 0. I also assume that lim a→0 p 0 (a) = ∞ and lim a→∞ p 0 (a) = 0.
Assume that s 1 is uninformative and induces a uniform prior on Ω. Let s 2 be given by Pr(s 2 = ω | ω) = h. Assume that the probability of a success conditional on the fact that the agent's action equals the state, y = ω, is k. Assume that the probability of success for actions different from the state, y 6 = ω, is z where k > z. Finally, assume that if the agent does not process s 2 , he is equally likely to take any action y ∈ Ω and the probability that such a random action matches the state is b where b < h.
For simplicity assume that both the agent and the principal are risk neutral. Let the agent's utility function be U (w, a) = w − a and the principal's utility function be V (r, w) = r − w. Let the revenue of the principal be 1 after a success and 0 after a failure.
Performance Contract
As the benchmark, I characterize the first-best effort level where the marginal social benefit from exerting effort equals the marginal social cost. The first best effort level, a f , is then defined implicitly by the following equality:
where q = (h − b)(k − z) measures the productivity gain from processing signal s 2 . 21 This productivity increases in h, the precision of the agent's signal, and in k, the probability of success conditional on an optimal action. The productivity decreases in b, the probability of making the right choice by chance, and in z, the probability of success conditional on a nonoptimal choice. With a slight abuse of notation, let the vector q denote the collection of the parameters, h, b, k, z. 22 Let's now turn to the case where the agent's effort is unobservable. Assume that the agent is protected by limited liability and w ≥ 0 has to be true in all contingencies. 23 Let the agent's outside option be 0. Given the assumption of risk-neutrality, the principal's optimal contract is one that offers the lowest compensation possible after a failure. This implies that the compensation after a failure is w F = 0. Let w S denote the compensation offered to the agent upon a success. In light of these considerations, the principal's problem is to maximize his expected utility
subject to the agent's incentive compatibility constraint a n (q, w S ) = arg max
Given the agent's utility function, we can replace this incentive compatibility constraint with its first-order condition. 24 To guarantee that there is a unique equilibrium, I assume in what follows that p 000 (a) ≤ 0 for all a. The optimal effort level, a n (q), which solves this constrained maximization problem is defined implicitly by following equation:
Let w n (q) denote the corresponding optimal wage. Note that a n (q) is always smaller than a f (q). The reason is that the principal faces a trade-off: implementing a higher level of effort is only feasible at the cost of leaving a higher rent for the agent. Thus effort is lower and the agent's rent is higher than in the first-best. A simple comparative static result follows from Eq. (8) . Increasing h or k increases the 21 The above specification rests on additional abuse of notation. I denote the probability of making the right choice conditional on processing the information by h. Note that this probability is slightly higher than the precision of s 2 . Formally, if Pr(s 1 = ω | ω) = e h then h = e h + (1 − e h) |Ω| |Ω|−1 b where |Ω| is the cardinality of the action space when Ω has finite number of elements. If Ω has infinite number of elements, then h = e h. 22 I assume that the solution is always interior. 23 For a general analysis of limited liability contracts in moral hazard see Innes (1990) see also Dewatripont and Bolton (2005) . 24 In characterizing optimal incentives in this section, I can ignore the individual participation constraints since the agent's outside option is a wage of 0 and by limited liability she cannot receive a lower wage under a performance contract either. productivity of processing information and thus generates higher utility for the principal given a contract. Since p 0 > 1 is always true in equilibrium, a higher h or k allows for cheaper incentives and thus the principal wants to induce more effort, implying that effort is increasing in h and k.
Lemma 1 An increase in h or k increases the equilibrium effort level a n (q) and the payoff of the principal.
Bayesian Monitoring
The effort level characterized by Eq. (8) is optimal given that the supervisor observes a performance measure that consists only of success and failure. Information about the agent's effort choice, however, reduces the inefficiency of the above simple incentive contract. 25 In my setup this means that obtaining more precise reports about the agent's action allows the principal to induce the same level of effort at a lower cost.
Consider that the principal can monitor the agent by learning the agent's action and the information that was available to him. Such monitoring is still imperfect because the relationship between effort and taking an optimal action is stochastic. In case of such monitoring, the optimal contract rewards the agent if his action is the one suggested by the information available to him and punishes the agent otherwise. Since whether a success happens or not does not contain additional information, it is easy to see that such a compensation scheme is optimal. 26 Given such a reward scheme, the agent's incentive compatibility constraint can now be expressed by the following first-order condition:
and the optimal contract induces an equilibrium effort level, a m (q), defined implicitly by the following condition:
and let w 0 m (q) denote the corresponding optimal wage. As I prove in the appendix, the equilibrium effort under monitoring, a 0 m (q), is always greater than equilibrium effort without monitoring a n (q). The reason is that monitoring improves the trade-off between providing incentives and leaving a positive rent for the agent because it rewards good decisions rather than good luck. As a result, if the principal monitors the agent he can 25 A classic insight in agency theory, since the seminal work of Holmstrom (1979) , is that increasing observability allows for more efficient contracts. 26 The setup in this section is not strictly speaking that which is studied in the context of optimal liability rules, e.g. Shavell (1980) . The reason is that only the agent's action but not his effort is potentially observable for the supervisor. In cases where there is a corner-solution and b = 0, an investigation of the agent's action perfectly reveals his effort however.
induce the same level of effort at a lower cost and hence for any given level of effort, he realizes a greater expected profit. The fact that it becomes cheaper for the principal to induce effort means that the principal is willing to pay for monitoring.
Lemma 2
The equilibrium under monitoring induces a higher effort, a n (q) < a m (q) and the principal is better-off with monitoring the agent.
Biased Monitoring
Assume now that the supervisor observes the true state ω. Assume further that the projected information is such that along with s 2 it perfectly reveals the state if and only if s 2 is processed. This means that a biased supervisor perceives the true problem as if h = 1 for all h ≤ 1. Furthermore, it also implies that upon not processing s 2 the supervisor still believes that the probability that the agent can take the right action is b .The consequence of such information projection is that the supervisor overinfers from the agent's choice. Whenever y 6 = ω, the supervisor takes this as evidence that the agent did not read the information available to her. Hence, if the agent did read and follow s 2 but this information turned out to be 'incorrect' ex-post, the supervisor mistakenly infers that the agent did not read s 2 . The probability of this mistake is p(a)(1 − h), the probability that s 2 is processed times the probability that s 2 did not suggest the right action.
Assume that the agent correctly predicts the bias of the supervisor. In this case, the agent's effort is given by the solution of the following maximization problem:
Comparing this condition with that of Eq. (9), it is immediately visible that the return to effort is smaller in the biased case than in the Bayesian one. Note that while in the Bayesian case the precision of s 2 does not enter into the agent's maximization it does enter in the biased case. The reason for the former is that an unbiased supervisor can distinguish -up to probability (1 − b) -between a bad decision that is due to wrong ex-ante information and a bad decision that results from not processing a signal. In contrast, a biased supervisor mistakes a bad decision due to wrong ex-ante information to a bad decision that is due to not having processed the available information. This implies that for any given compensation w S the agent exerts less effort in the biased case.
Our next result is a corollary to the above proposition. It shows that contexts where information projection is particularly severe, monitoring decreases rather than increases effort and total output. The reason is that the contract that is optimal in the case of Bayesian monitoring offers a wage that is lower than the wage under the performance contract without monitoring. This has the effect of decreasing effort. The fact that the agent is monitored has the effect of increasing effort. In the Bayesian case the latter effect is always stronger than the former. In the biased case though if the probability of mistaken punishment is high enough the wage effect might be stronger than the monitoring effect.
Corollary 2 There exists h * > 0 such that if h ≤ h * then a 1 m (q, w 0 m ) < a n (q, w n ) and surplus is smaller under monitoring and w S = w 0 m than under no monitoring and w S = w n .
This result claims that if ex-ante information is sufficiently noisy then monitoring will backfire and induce less effort than the simple performance contract without monitoring. It implies that more information, even if it is costless to acquire, can hurt all parties. This result depends on the fact that it is only the agent but not the principal anticipates the bias.
As a final scenario, consider the case where the bias of the supervisor is common knowledge between the principal and the agent. The result is that information projection still introduces an inefficiency in the contractual relationship. If the principal is aware of the supervisor's bias then he knows that with a certain probability the supervisor will come to the wrong conclusion. Since the principal can only determine the probability of this mistake and not whether the supervisor's report is actually wrong or right, information projection still adds noise to the supervisor's reports. Thus, the data obtained by monitoring contains more noise than in the Bayesian case, which implies decreases the efficiency of monitoring. As a result, the principal decides to induce less effort than he would had he believed that the supervisor had perfect Bayesian perception. Let the effort level induced be denoted by a m,b (q) and implicitly defined by:
Proposition 7
If the principal anticipates the bias, he induces effort a m,b (q) < a m (q) and a m,b (q) is increasing in h.
I assumed so far that the projected information leads to an exaggeration of the precision of s 2 . It might happen though that the projected information leaves h unaffected but leads to an exaggeration of b, the probability of taking the right action without processing information. In the above framework such a mistake does not affect output because it does not change the probability with which an agent is rewarded conditional on exerting effort. In a more general setup, however, where h and b are known ex-ante only to the agent, and where compensation is conditional on the supervisor's assessment of these parameters exaggerating b might also lower the agent's effort.
Communication
In the previous sections, I focused on the problem of performance evaluation but information projection might affect other aspects of organizational life as well. One such domain is communication. Both intuition and evidence presented in Section 2, indicates that when giving advice to or taking advice from someone, people assume too much about what the other party knows. In this Section, I demonstrate two ways information projection affects efficient information transmission between a speaker and a listener. These two themes are credulity and unintended ambiguity.
Credulity refers to a case where a listener follows the recommendation of a speaker too closely because he assumes that the recommendation of the speaker already incorporates his private information. As a result, he will fail to combine his private information with the speaker's recommendation and will fail to sufficiently deviate from this recommendation even if he should. Unintended ambiguity refers to the case where a speaker mistakenly sends a message that is too ambiguous to the listener. A biased speaker exaggerates the probability with which her background knowledge is shared with the listener, and hence will overestimate how likely it is that the listener will be able to interpret her message. I show that depending on the messages available for the speaker, the speaker might communicate too often or too rarely.
Credulity
Consider a situation where an advisee has to take an action y e that is as close as possible to an unknown state ω on which the shared prior is N (0, σ 0 ). This state could describe the optimal solution of a research problem, the best managerial solution on the organization of production or the diagnosis of a patient. The advisee has some private information about ω that is given by s e = ω + ε e where ε e is a mean zero Gaussian noise term such that the posterior on ω, given the prior and s e , is N (b s e , b σ e ). The advisor also has some private information about ω given by s r = ω + ε r where ε r is a mean zero Gaussian noise term such that the posterior on ω, given the prior and s r , is N (b s r , b σ r ). 27 The advisor makes a recommendation y r equal to her posterior mean. The advisor cannot communicate the full distribution or the true signal directly. Such limits on communication might arise due to complexity considerations, or because it's prohibitively costly to explain this private information. Instead, she can give a recommendation regarding the best action she would follow.
Let the advisee's and the advisor's objective be thus the advisee's goal is to take an action that minimizes the distance between his action and the state. Given the advisor's recommendation y r and his private information s e , a rational advisee takes action y 0 e such that:
where c 0 = and N (ω ; c, v) is short form for a normally distributed random variable with mean c and variance v. This action is based on the correct perception of how information is distributed between the advisor and the advisee. It thus efficiently aggregates information in the recommendation y r and the advisee's private information s e .
Consider now the case where the advisee exhibits full information projection. Here he believes that the advisor's recommendation is based not only on the realization of s r but also on s e , and thus it already incorporates all information available to the parties. As a result, he reacts to the advice y r by taking action y 1 e such that:
where c 1 = y r and v 1 = v 0 . It follows that if the advisee exhibits full information projection, he puts all the weight on what the advisor says and no weight on his private information. This way, his private information is lost. The following proposition shows that a biased advisee follows the recommendation of his advisor too closely.
Proposition 8 E |y r − y ρ e | is decreasing in ρ and E¯y r − y 1 e¯= 0 where expectations are taken with respect to the true distribution of signals.
This proposition follows from the discussion above. Note that the more precise the advisee's private information is, the greater is the loss, relative to the unbiased. In the biased case, information aggregation fails because the advisee fails to sufficiently update the advisor's recommendation based on his information. One way to eliminate this information loss is to invest in a technology that allows the advisor to communicate her posterior distribution, the other option is to block communication between the advisor and the advisee. Assuming full information projection, the advisee is ex-ante better-off without a recommendation if and only if his signal is more precise than the advisor's signal. More generally, the following corollary is true:
Corollary 3 There exists an indicator function k(ρ, σ e , σ r ) ∈ {0, 1} such that the advisee is better-off with a recommendation if k(ρ, σ e , σ r ) = 0, and the advisee is better-off without a recommendation if k(ρ, σ e , σ r ) = 1. The function k(ρ, σ e , σ r ) is increasing in ρ and σ r and decreasing in σ e .
Ambiguity, Over-and Under-Communication
In the above context, information projection leads to credulity because the advisee projects his private information. Let's now turn to a context where the advisor projects her private information about the state ω. Consider an information structure analogous to ones in Examples 2 and 3 of Section 4. Let ω = where ω = 1 2 and ω, 1 , 2 ∈ {−1, 1}. Assume that s 0 = 1 is the advisor's background knowledge, which cannot be communicated to the advisee. Let s 1 = 2 be the signal that can be communicated to the advisee. As an example of s 0 and s 1 consider a radiologist who speaks to a patient about the patient's medical condition ω. Signal s 0 incorporates the radiologist's knowledge of medicine such as the meaning of a complex medical term. Signal s 1 is a medical term that describes the condition of the patient. If the patient does not know the meaning of a medical term, then s 1 does not incorporate any information to him. If the patient knows the meaning of the medical term, he can interpret s 1 in light of s 0 . The results in this section depend on the existence of partial information projection and are sensitive to the redescription of signals, as mentioned in Section 3.
Let there be a third signal s 2 , Pr(s 2 = ω | ω) = h where 0.5 < h < 1, which provides noisy information about ω, but which is informative even if the patient does not know s 0 . Let the payoff to the advisor be 1 if the advisee guesses ω correctly, and let it be 0 otherwise. For simplicity, let the true probability with which signals (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 ) are available to the advisee be p e = (0, 0, 0). Assume that the patient has a symmetric prior on ω and that the advisor can send only one signal because sending two signals is prohibitively costly. Sending one message costs c. The table below summarizes the advisor's perceived payoff as a function of a ρ:
Consider first the case of an unbiased advisor. If an unbiased advisor speaks, she sends s 1 . To see this, note that s 1 payoff dominates s 2 because s 2 does not convey any valuable information about ω. Furthermore, the unbiased advisor sends s 2 whenever c < h. Consider now the biased advisor. A biased advisor exaggerates the probability with which any of the signals s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 are available to her advisee. This has two effects: the advisor overestimates how much the advisee understands from s 1 and underestimates the return to sending a costly message. The first implies that if the advisor is sufficiently biased, she believes that s 1 dominates s 2 . The second effect implies that the advisee remains silent too often.
A fully biased advisor always decides to remain silent because she assumes that the advisee knows ω anyway. Conditional on the fact that s 2 is perceived to dominate s 1 , i.e. ρ < h, the advisor is more likely to remain silent the lower h is. The reason is that the lower h is, the less informative s 1 is. Conditional on the fact that s 1 is perceived to dominate s 2 , i.e. ρ < h, the advisor is more likely to remain silent the higher is h. Since a biased advisor exaggerates the probability with which s 1 is already available to the advisee, the higher h is, the more likely it is that she thinks that the advisee will guess correctly anyway. The following proposition proves the above results formally.
Proposition 9 Suppose ρ < h, the advisor sends s 2 if c ≤ k 2 (ρ, h) where k(ρ, h) is increasing in h and decreasing in ρ, and remains silent otherwise. Suppose ρ > h. The advisor sends s 1 if c ≤ k 1 (ρ, h) where k 1 (ρ, h) is decreasing in h and remains silent otherwise. Suppose that h = 0.5, the advisor sends s 1 if and only if c ≤ 1
The last part of the above proposition claims that if s 2 is uninformative, the advisor communicates too often. This follows from the fact that an unbiased advisor never speaks if h = 0.5. A biased advisor, however, decides to communicate because she overestimates the probability with which her message s 1 will be understood by her audience. Importantly, the fact whether the advisor sends s 1 or not is not monotonic in ρ. If ρ = 0 the advisor never sends it because she realizes that s 1 is meaningless to the advisee. If ρ = 0 the advisor never sends s 1 because she believes that the advisor knows the state ω already. It is easy to see that the propensity to send s 1 is increasing in ρ if ρ ≤ 0.5 and decreasing in σ if ρ ≥ 0.5. Thus information projection can both lead to too much communication and too little and whether one or the other is true might depend both on the set of messages available and also on the size of the advisor's bias.
Conclusion
The applications in this paper are motivated by problems and evidence from labor markets, organization, medicine, and law, but they are not exhaustive in any sense. I conclude the paper by considering possible further applications and extensions.
One possible extension of the over-inference and underestimation results of Section 2 is to the analysis of social networks. Recall that a biased guest will be too optimistic about the kindness of the host if the host and the guest have similar tastes, and will be too pessimistic about the host's kindness if their tastes differ. This implies that if groups are formed based on similarity in taste and also on the perception of social intentions, then members of a group might be too similar in taste. More importantly, such groups might develop hostility towards each other because they mistakenly attribute taste differences to hostile intentions. As a corollary of the underestimation result of Proposition 2, it might also be true that a social network will have too few links.
The underestimation result can also be extended to the settings of Section 6. A biased advisee might underestimate how attentive his advisor is because he exaggerates the precision of the advice an attentive advisor could give. Here attentiveness is defined as the probability that the advisor bases her recommendation on information rather than on noise. A biased advisor might underestimate how perceptive her advisee is because she does not recognize how ambiguous her messages are. Here perceptiveness is defined as the probability that the advisee listens to the advisor's message. Such inferences can result in the breakdown of communication between parties who have a lot to share with each other but suffer from projection bias.
Another direction to extend the ideas presented in this paper is to consider the related phenomenon of ignorance projection. Ignorance projection happens when someone who does not observe a signal underestimates the probability with which this signal is available to others. Though evidence on ignorance projection is not as strong as the evidence on information projection, it might still be a phenomenon worth studying, both empirically and theoretically. Finally, one could study information and ignorance projection in the intrapersonal domains where people project their current information and their current ignorance on their future selves leading to distortions in prospective memory. Proof. Note first that since z > h a host is always believed to follow s 2 if he observes the realization of s 2 because s 2 is more precise than s 1 . The biased conditional likelihoods are given by
and π Proof. Note first that the perceived ex-ante likelihood of the event that y = ω, Pr ρ (y = ω), is increasing in ρ. By virtue of the properties of the Bayes' rule for all ρ
The true expected biased likelihood of θ kind is given by Proof. Note that Proof. The expected posterior is the probability weighted average of the posterior after a success and the posterior after a failure.
For a given type θ this is equal to
for all θ. 1 , s 2 , θ) . Hence in the biased case the overall probability of success is overestimated and the overall probability of failure is underestimated. It follows that λ ρ S is decreasing in ρ because Pr
is increasing in θ for all ρ, it follows that the expected weight on higher types is decreasing in ρ. Formally,
where the equality follows from the fact that Pr ρ (S) + (1 − Pr ρ (S)) = 1 for all ρ. Note that this implies that for all ρ > 0 lower types are overweighted relative to higher types. Since Pr ρ (F | θ) is decreasing in θ for all ρ it follows that for any θ * < 1
Furthermore, since λ
whenever ρ > ρ 0 .
Proof of Corollary 1:
Since for both s 3 and s 0 3 Pr ρ (S | θ) is increasing in θ this corollary follows from the above proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose Pr
Proof. Note first that π ρ 1 (θ | S) is given by :
To show that π ρ 1 (S) FOSD π 0 1 (S) we have to show that
One can re-write this inequality to obtain the following one: 
If this term is positive, the agent has a non-Bayesian incentive to abstain from the production of s 0 . If this term is positive, the agent has a non-Bayesian incentive to engage in the production of s 0 . It follows from the proof of Proposition 3 that if λ ρ (θ) > λ 0ρ (θ) then λ Proof of Lemma 1: An increase in h or k increases the equilibrium effort level a n (q) and the payoff of the principal.
Proof. First let's derive the optimal contract as given by Eq. (8) . The principal's maximization problem yields the following Lagrangian:
To show the increase in the principal's welfare note that EV n = p(a n )q + bk + (1 − b)z − (p(a n ) + b/(h − b) + z/q)/p 0 (a Proof of Proposition 6: The agent's effort choice a 1 m (q, w S ) < a 0 m (q, w S ) and a 1 m (q, w S ) is increasing in h.
Proof. Let's fix a wage w S . It follows from the discussion in the text that the agent's effort choice is given by the following maximization problem 
The first-order condition is then given by p 0 h(1 − b)w S = 1. It is easy to see that for any given w S , a 1 m (q, w S ) < a 0 m (h, w S ) as long as h < 1 and also that a 1 m (q, w S ) is increasing in h.
Proof of Corollary 2:
There always exists h * > 0 such that if h ≤ h * then a 1 m (q, w 0 m ) is lower than a n (q, w n ). The social surplus under monitoring and w 0 m is smaller than under no monitoring and w n .
Proof. To see this corollary note that a 0 m (q, w S ) does not depend on h directly. It follows that a(w n , h) is such that p 0 (a) = p 0 (a n ) and a 1 m (q, w 0 m ) satisfies p 0 (a) = p 0 (a 0 m )/h. Hence for any p 0 (a n ) < ∞ there exists h * such that if h < h * then p 0 (a m )/h > p 0 (a n ). This implies that a 1 m (q, w 0 m ) < a n (q, w n ). Since social surplus is increasing in a as long as qp 0 > 1 it follows that monitoring decreases social surplus. 
Comparing Eq. (28) with Eq. (26) it follows a m,b < a m as long as h < 1 because the RHS of (28) is always greater than the RHS of Eq. (26) . Furthermore since the RHS of (28) is decreasing in h, a m,b is decreasing in h.
Proof of Proposition 8: E |y r − y ρ e | is decreasing in ρ and E¯y r − y 1 e¯= 0 where expectations are taken with respect to the true distribution of signals.
Proof.
Since s e and s r are independent it follows that the joint distribution of ω, s e and s r is given by a multivariate normal distribution with mean vector (0, 0, 0) and covariance matrix: . Consider now the biased case where ρ = 1. Here the advisee believes that y r = E[ω | s e , s r ] and hence takes an action y 1 e = y r . For ρ < 1 the advisee believes that with probability ρ it is the case that y r = E[ω | s e , s r ] and with probability 1 − ρ it is the case that y r = E[ω | s r ]. Hence it is always true that y ρ e ∈ [min{y 0 e , y r } , max{{y 0 e , y r }]. Furthermore as the probability ρ increases |y ρ e − y r | decreases.
Proof of Corollary 4:
There exists an indicator function k(ρ, σ e , σ r ) ∈ {0, 1} such that the advisee is better-off with a recommendation if k(ρ, σ e , σ r ) = 0, and the advisee is better-off without a recommendation if k(ρ, σ e , σ r ) = 1. The function k(ρ, σ e , σ r ) is increasing in ρ and σ r and decreasing in σ e .
Proof. Note first that −E(y ρ e − ω) 2 is decreasing in ρ by virtue of Proposition 8 since the estimate of ω has the lowest variance given s 1 and s 2 if if y e = E[ω | s e , y r ]. Also for a fixed ρ, E |y r − y ρ e | is decreasing in σ r and increasing in σ e . Hence if we fix σ e < M < ∞, there always exists sufficiently large σ r such that −E(b s e − ω) 2 > −E(y ρ e − ω) 2 . Similarly, for a fixed σ r > 0 there always exists σ e sufficiently small that −E(b s e − ω) 2 > −E(y ρ e − ω) 2 . It follows that k(σ e , σ r , ρ) is increasing in σ e decreasing in σ r and increasing in ρ.
Proof of Proposition 9: Suppose ρ < h, the advisor sends s 2 if c ≤ k 2 (ρ, h) where k(ρ, h) is increasing in h and decreasing in ρ, and remains silent otherwise. Suppose ρ > h. The advisor sends s 1 if c ≤ k 1 (ρ, h) where k 1 (ρ, h) is decreasing in h and remains silent otherwise. Suppose that h = 0.5, the advisor sends s 1 if and only if c ≤ (1 − ρ)(1 − ρh)ρ = k 1 (ρ, h) . Note that k 1 (ρ, h) is decreasing in h.
